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The Right to Die as an Issue of Privacy: 
A Selective Bibliography 
Sandra S. Klein 
ABSTRACT. The issue of whether or not an individual has the right 
to choose when he or she will die, is a very controversial one for 
many reasons. Further complicating the issue is the question of who, 
if anyone, has the right to decide for those who are unable to choose 
for themselves. The bibliography which follows includes articles 
which discuss this topic from a right to privacy perspective, and 
should prove useful to those researchers who are new to the subject, 
as well as to those who are already familiar with the many complex 
issues involved. 
INTRODUCTION 
While it is certainly fair to say that many contemporary privacy issues 
are of increasing importance to the general public, the questions sur-
rounding the right to die issue are becoming both more a part of the public 
consciousness, and more controversial, than many commentators would 
have thought until recently. Current news media discussion of "assisted" 
suicide follows not long after scholars and politically responsive legisla-
tors debated the social and ethical consequences of a perceived "right" to 
die. 
Debate in this area appears largely concerned with several key ques-
tions, many stemming from a basic uncertainty as to whether such a 
"right" truly exists, and if so, to what extent it might be based in constitu-
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tional reality (see, for example, Robert M. Bratton's article, "The Right to 
Die: A Constitutional One?"). 
Obviously related to the constitutional issue is the question of general 
privacy rights serving as an intellectual umbrella for the proposed right to 
die. It is noted, for example, in Vmcent Borst's analysis ("The Right to 
Die: An Extension of the Right to Privacy") that individuals do possess a 
right to purposively choose death because such an option follows from the 
constitutionally-protected right of privacy. Based in an examination of 
case law, Borst contends that such an option clearly rests under the Su-
preme Court 's "penumbra" concept, a doctrine that expands on rights 
explicitly granted by the Constitution. 
The discussion of this issue appears unavoidably complicated by its 
relationship to other privacy issues. As concerns such as the right to 
abortion, or even the very specific right to privacy regarding personal 
communications, are often considered with an awareness of political, 
religious, or social perspectives, the right to die is a matter that has not, 
and no doubt will not, be considered in a vacuum. 
Further complicating the discussion is a subordinate dichotomy, com-
petence vs incompetence: If such a right exists for those in control of their 
mental faculties , to what extent does it exist (and to what degree should it 
be monitored) where the individual involved is legally incompetent? No-
where has this question been more important than in the area of terminally 
ill patients who are no longer capable of making reasoned decisions. 
Elizabeth Evola and Denise Yegge consider this difficult issue in their 
article, "Until Death Do Us Part: The Decision-making Process For the 
Terminally Ill." Here, the authors note the balancing process that courts go 
through in order to consider the patient's right to privacy (i.e., to choose 
death) and the state's duty to preserve life. 
The Cruzan case is a particularly cogent example of this need to bal-
ance the rights of the individual against the perceived duties of the state. 
Thomas Hafemeister, in "Charting the Course Between Life and Death: 
The Supreme Court Takes its First Cautious Steps in Cruzan," examines 
the rights of individuals to make decisions regarding life-sustaining med-
ical treatment. He notes that the Court refused to recognize a constitutional 
right to privacy in this limited context. This proves important if lower 
courts are to find legal means by which to find a viable association be-
tween privacy and right to die issues. Both Tucker Ronzetti, "Constituting 
Family and Death 1brough the Struggle With State Power: Cruzan v. 
Director, Missouri Department of Health," and Desiree Watson, "Cruzan 
and the Right to Die: A Perspective on Privacy Interests," et al., consider 
this case from varying points of view. 
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Several other articles examine related matters including: the need for 
uniform legislation (Bernard Freamon, "Death With Dignity Laws: A Plea 
for Uniform Legislation"); the role of government in decision-making 
(Stanley Cox, "Government as Arbiter, not Custodian: Relational Privacy 
as Foundation for a Right to Refuse Medical Treatment Prolonging Incom-
petent's Lives"). Similarly, articles dealing with religious and moral issues 
are included as illustrative of the need to review the issue from an other-
than-legal point of view. (See, for example, David Richards article, 
"Constitutional Privacy, the Right to Die and the Meaning of Life: A 
Moral Analysis," and Tom Stacy, " Death, Privacy, and the Free Exercise 
of Religion.") 
Underscoring the inherent difficulties in seeking some socially reason-
able and legally supportable equilibrium between individual and govern-
mental rights regarding the right to die issue, the bibliography which 
follows includes articles which, nonetheless, add to our understanding of 
this complex matter. The time period covered is from 1980-1992, and the 
articles listed here should serve as both an introduction to this area of 
concern for those new to this topic, as well as providing a springboard for 
additional research for those scholars who are well-versed on the topic. 
RIGHT TO DIE 
MONOGRAPHS 
Cantor, Norman L. Legal Frontiers of Death and Dying. Bloomington, In.: 
Indiana University Press, 1987. 
Doudera, A. Edward, and J. Douglas Peters, eds. Legal and Ethical As-
pects of Treating Critically and Terminally lll Patients. Alll1 Arbor, 
Michigan: AUPHA Press, 1982. Includes bibliography and index. 
Glick, Henry R. The Right to Die: Policy Innovation and Its Conse-
quences. New York: Columbia University Press, 1992. 
Meisel, Alan. The Right to Die. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1989. 
Riga, Peter J. Right to Die or Right to Live?: Legal Aspects of Dying and 
Death. Frederick, MD: Associated Faculty Press, Inc., 1981. " Chapter 
ill: Privacy and the Right to Die." Includes bibliography. 
Sloan, Irving J. The Right to Die: Legal and Ethical Problems. New York: 
Oceana Publications, Inc., 1988. 
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PERIODICALS 
Bates, Kevin W. "Live or Let Die; Who Decides an Incompetent's Fate?" 
Brigham Young University Law Review 1982(Spring 1982): 387-400. 
Blumenthal, Thomas M. "Judicial Activism: the Politicization of the 
Right of Privacy." Saint Louis University Public Law Review ll(Fall 
1992): 329-358. 
Bratton, Robert M. "The Right to Die: A Constitutional One?" The Jurist 
4l(Winter 1981): 155-175. 
Brill, Alida. "Part Four: Last Rights." In Nobody's Business: Paradoxes 
of Privacy. Reading, Mass.: Addisson-Wesley Publishing Company, 
1990. pp. 145-186. Discusses the fact that death and dying used to 
occur privately and in the home, while it is now a much more public 
affair. We cannot choose how or when we will die without contending 
with public/legal issues. 
Borst, Vincent T. "The Right to Die: An Extension of the Right to Pri-
vacy." John Marshall Law Review 18:4(Surnmer 1985): 895-914. Pri-
marily a survey of federal and state case law regarding the right of an 
individual to die, this article supports the idea that such a right is 
"encompassed within the constitutionally protected right to privacy." 
Also considered is the association between procreation, abortion, and 
the right to die as extensions of the rights to privacy developed under 
the "penumbra" concept applied to the Bill of Rights by the Supreme 
Court. The final elements considered are proposed "guidelines for the 
application of constitutional principles in right to die cases." 
Capron, Alexander Morgan. "Borrowed Lessons: The Role of Ethical 
Distinctions in Framing Law on Life-sustaining Treatment." Arizona 
State Law Journal 1984:4(Fall 1984): 647-660. 
Childress, James F. "Refusal of Lifesaving Treatment by Adults." Journal 
of Family Law 23(February 1985): 191-215. 
Clementino, Barbara 1. "A Proposed Amendment to the California Nat-
ural Death Act to Assure the Statutory Right to Control Life Sustaining 
Treatment Decisions." University of San Francisco Law Review 
17(Spring 1983): 579-609. 
Collins, Peggy L., "The Foundations of the Right to Die." West Virginia 
Law Review 90:1(Fall 1987): 235-282. 
Cox, Stanley E. "Government as Arbiter, not Custodian: Relational Pri-
vacy as Foundation for a Right to Refuse Medical Treatment Pro-
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longing Incompetents' Lives." New Mexico Law Review 18:l(January 
1988): 131-152. 
Eisenberg, Karen Gross. "Surrogate Decision-making for the Terminally 
Ill." Annual Survey of American Law 1988(Summer 1988): 353-384. 
Evola, Elizabeth Muraca, and Denise L. Yegge." 'Until Death do us Part' 
The Decision-Making Process for the Terminally Ill." Adelphia Law 
Journal 4(1985-86): 143-167. The question of if and when to purpo-
sively end the life of a terminally ill patient is a problematic one for the 
medical staff, family, and society at large. This article examines both 
the individual's right to privacy (i.e., termination of support), and the 
state's interest in preserving life, and notes that the courts have gener-
ally balanced these interests against each other in making their deci-
sions. Several parties to the decision-making process are identified by 
the author: the medical personnel involved, the family, ethics commit-
tees, and the courts. Finally, the "living will" is evaluated, as is an 
"expanded ethics committee" concept as an alternative to simple court 
intervention. 
Fentiman, Linda C. "Privacy and Personhood Revisited: A New Frame-
work for Substitute Decisionmaking for the Incompetent, Incurably Ill 
Adult." George Washington Law Review 57:4(March 1989): 801-848. 
Flewellen, Linda Nell. "Criminal Law: Who Will Decide When a Patient 
May Die?" University of Florida Law Review 32(Summer 1980): 
808-820. 
Freamon, Bernard K. "Death With Dignity Laws: A Plea for Uniform 
Legislation." Seton Hall Legislative Journal 5(Wmter 1982): 105-147. 
Haber, Joram Graf. "Euthanasia for Incompetent Patients: A Proposed 
Model." Pace Law Review 3(Winter 1983): 351-374. 
Hafemeister, Thomas L. "Charting the Course Between Life and Death: 
The Supreme Court Takes its First Cautious Steps in Cruzan." Probate 
Law Journal 10:2(1990): 113-140. In Cruzan v Director, Missouri De-
panment of Health (110 S Ct 2841, 1990), the Court dealt with the right 
of individuals to make decisions regarding life-sustaining medical treat-
ment. The article examines the case history in detail, noting that the 
courts' review was substantially limited to the specific facts of the 
particular situation at hand, and noting further that the decision was, 
therefore, of limited generalizability as precedence. In terms of a pri-
vacy rights analysis, "the Courts' refusal to recognize a federal consti-
tutional right to privacy in this context will limit the ability of future 
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courts to draw upon the 'privacy' line of cases to flesh out the bounds 
of the right to refuse" such life-sustaining medical treatment. 
Hill, Robert Everage. "Euthanasia: The Right to be 'Let' Alone." 
Southern University Law Review 7(Fall 1980): 101-112. 
Howell, Joyce A. "Guaranteeing the Right to Privacy: A Proposal." Rut-
gers Law Journal l 7(Spring-Summer 1986): 615-657. 
Jamieson, Scott M. "The Effect of Incarceration on the Right to Die." 
New England Journal on Criminal & Civil Confinement 11 :2(Summer 
1985): 395-419. 
Jordan, James M., ill. "Incubating for the State: The Precarious Au-
tonomy of Persistently Vegetative and Brain-dead Pregnant Women." 
Georgia Law Review 22:4(Summer 1988): 1103-1165. 
Lyon, Edward A. "The Right to Die: An Exercise of Infonned Consent, 
Not an Extension of the Constitutional Right to Privacy." University of 
Cincinnati Law Review 58(Spring 1990): 1367-1395. 
Marzen, Thomas J. et al. "Suicide: A Constitutional Right?" Duquesne 
Law Review 24:1(Fall 1985): 1-242. 
Patterson, Elizabeth G. "Health Care Choice and the Constitution: Recon-
ciling Privacy and Public Health." Rutgers Law Review 42(Fall 1989): 
1-91. Discusses the question of whether or not "the constitutional right 
to privacy is broad enough to encompass the decision whether to accept 
or refuse life-sustaining medical treatment." 
Richards, David A.J. "Constitutional Privacy, the Right to Die and the 
Meaning of Life: A Moral Analysis." William and Mary Law Review 
22:3(Spring 1981): 327-419. 
Riga, Peter J. "Euthanasia, The Right to Die and Privacy: Observations on 
Some Recent Cases." Lincoln Law Review 11:2(1980): 109-165. Dis-
cusses the need to address the concerns of all parties involved (i.e., 
doctors, hospitals, patients, etc.), examines the context of the argument, 
and presents concrete cases. 
Ronzetti, T.A. Tucker. "Constituting Family and Death Through the 
Struggle With State Power: Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of 
Health." University of Miami Law Review 46(September 1991): 
149-204. 
Stacy, Tom. "Death, Privacy, and the Free Exercise of Religion." Cornell 
Law Review 77(March 1992): 490-595. 
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Volzer, Harvey J. " Laetrile and the Privacy Right in Decisional Responsi-
bility." Medical Trial Technique Quarterly 26(Spring 1980): 395-429. 
Laetrile is a drug that is used in the treatment of terminally ill cancer 
patients. The question of its use arose because the drug has not been 
approved for use in this country by the Food and Drug Administration. 
The author argues that "the choice of Laetrile is essentially individual, 
a quality of life decision for which only the decision-maker is ulti-
mately responsible." His review of the issue leads him to the conclu-
sion that "at the point where the individual invokes the privacy right in 
decisional responsiblity, the State no longer has any compelling reason 
for interference." 
Watson, Desiree E. "Cruzan and the Right to Die: A Perspective on Pri-
vacy Interests." Mercer Law Review 42(Spring 1991): ll47-1181. 
Wolhander, Steven J. "Voluntary Active Euthanasia for the Terminally Ill 
and the Constitutional Right to Privacy." Cornell Law Review 69(Jan-
uary 1984 ): 363-383. 
Z'.embar, Stephanie A. "Constitutional Law: Right to Privacy: Removal of 
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